accountingУчет. Анализ. АудитAccounting. Analysis. Auditing2408-93032619-130XFinancial University under The Government of Russian Federation10.26794/2408-9303-2016--6-93-101accounting-128Research ArticleМЕЖДУНАРОДНЫЙ ОПЫТСОВЕТ ЗАКОНОДАТЕЛЬНО НАЗНАЧАЕМЫХ АУДИТОРОВ - ЭТО ОРГАН, ПРИСПОСАБЛИВАЮЩИЙСЯ К СПЕЦИФИЧЕСКИМ ОСОБЕННОСТЯМ ИТАЛИИ, ИЛИ МОДЕЛЬ ЗАЩИТЫ В ТРАДИЦИОННОЙ СИСТЕМЕ КОРПОРАТИВНОГО УПРАВЛЕНИЯ?Is the Board of Statutory Auditors an Italian Parasitic Body or a Safeguard Model in the Traditional Corporate Governance System?МаринониМарко А.MarinoniM. A.marcoangelo.marinoni@unicatt.itКатолический университет Дель Сакро КуореRussian Federation2016170120190693101Copyright © Маринони М.А., 20192019Маринони М.А.Marinoni M.A.Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.https://accounting.fa.ru/jour/article/view/128

Совет законодательно назначаемых аудиторов в Италии всегда являлся особенностью национальной системы контроля за деятельностью компаний. Недавно произошли существенные изменения в его коллегиальной сущности, поскольку законодательный орган представил человека, который будет единственным законодательно назначаемым аудитором для компаний с ограниченной ответственностью (итальянская аббревиатура S.r.l.). Попытка устранить Совет законодательно назначаемых аудиторов частично удалась благодаря введению единовластного аудиторского органа, но в первую очередь за счет сокращения числа юридических лиц, которые законодательно обязаны иметь орган мониторинга (контроля) [1]. Итальянские законодатели подогнали национальную систему контроля под систему контроля, принятую в других странах мира, не усиливая при этом значимость роли аудитора, которая требует большого профессионального мастерства и предполагает значительную ответственность за защиту интересов стейкхолдеров (заинтересованных сторон). Кроме того, совершенно очевидно, что сравнение значимости коллегиальности и отдельного законодательно назначаемого аудитора явно не в пользу последнего; группа профессионалов значительно более эффективно осуществляет надзор за законностью бизнеса во всем многообразии и сложности его деятельности, лучше исправляет ошибки директоров и противостоит корпоративным претензиям акционеров.

The Italian Board of Statutory Auditors has always been our peculiarity in the company’s control system. The Board has recently lived a profound upheaval in its collegial essence as a legislature body has introduced the figure of the sole statutory auditor for the limited liability companies (the Italian acronym is S.r.l.). The Italian attempt to abolish the Board of Statutory Auditors has partially succeeded, thanks to the introduction of a monocratic auditing body, but, first of all, because of the reduction of the entities which must have the monitoring body according to the law [1]. The Italian legislator has adapted the system to the system of controls accepted by the rest of the world not by enhancing the value of a role that requires great skill and involves huge responsibility to protect the stakeholders. There is also no doubt that there is the value of collegiality, compared to that of the sole statutory auditor; a set of professionals is vastly more effective in overseeing the legality in all facets of the business complexity, in correcting the mistakes of directors and in opposing corporate claims of shareholders.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.