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<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="ru"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">accounting</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">Учет. Анализ. Аудит</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Accounting. Analysis. Auditing</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="ppub">2408-9303</issn><issn pub-type="epub">2619-130X</issn><publisher><publisher-name>Financial University under The Government of Russian Federation</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.26794/2408-9303-2025-12-1-83-96</article-id><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">accounting-685</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>ЗАРУБЕЖНЫЙ ОПЫТ</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="en"><subject>INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>Анализ динамики коррупционных издержек в условиях развития бизнеса</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Company Growth Factors, Workforce Size and Bribery Expenses (Perspective of Performance and Development of Companies)</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Ашури</surname><given-names>С.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Ashoori</surname><given-names>S.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>Саид Ашури — магистр бухгалтерского учета, Университет Азад в Алиабад Катуле, факультет менеджмента и бухгалтерского учета</p><p>Кашан, Иран</p></bio><bio xml:lang="en"><p>Saeed Ashoori — Master of Accounting, Azad University of Aliabad Katoul, Department of Management and Accounting</p><p>Aliabad Katoul, Iran</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">Saeedashoori1385@gmail.com</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Резаи</surname><given-names>А.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Rezaei</surname><given-names>A.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>Ахмад Резаи — магистр государственного управления, управления персоналом, факультет менеджмента и бухгалтерского учета</p><p>Алиабад Катул, Иран</p></bio><bio xml:lang="en"><p>Ahmad Rezaei — Master of Public Administration, Human Resources Management, Department of Management and Accounting</p><p>Aliabad Katoul, Iran</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">Rezaei.ahmad62@yahoo.com</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Махдави</surname><given-names>С.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Mahdavi</surname><given-names>S.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>Соганд Махдави — студент факультета менеджмента и бухгалтерского учета</p><p>Алиабад Катул, Иран</p></bio><bio xml:lang="en"><p>Sogand Mahdavi — student, Department of Management and Accounting</p><p>Aliabad Katoul, Iran</p></bio><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff-1"><aff xml:lang="ru"><institution>Исламский университет Азад, филиал в Алиабад Катул</institution><country>Иран</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en"><institution>Islamic Azad University Aliabad Katoul Branch</institution><country>Islamic Republic of Iran</country></aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2025</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>02</day><month>04</month><year>2025</year></pub-date><volume>12</volume><issue>1</issue><fpage>83</fpage><lpage>96</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Ашури С., Резаи А., Махдави С., 2025</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2025</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Ашури С., Резаи А., Махдави С.</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Ashoori S., Rezaei A., Mahdavi S.</copyright-holder><license xml:lang="ru" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.</license-p></license><license xml:lang="en" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://accounting.fa.ru/jour/article/view/685">https://accounting.fa.ru/jour/article/view/685</self-uri><abstract><p>Цель работы — проверка гипотезы о наличии устойчивой функциональной связи между величиной коррупционных издержек иранского бизнеса и экономическими показателями, характеризующими рост и развитие коммерческих компаний. Методы исследования. В работе использованы методы экономико-математического моделирования для анализа данных финансовой отчетности 100 иранских компаний, чьи акции котируются на Тегеранской фондовой бирже. Период исследования охватывает 2015–2022 гг. Авторами построена модель множественной линейной регрессии, где зависимой переменной выступает доля представительских и командировочных расходов в выручке от реализации товаров (работ, услуг). Независимые переменные включают показатели прироста выручки, увеличения численности персонала, роста производительности труда и другие факторы корпоративного роста. Результаты исследования и направления его дальнейшего развития. Статистические тесты подтвердили наличие устойчивой функциональной зависимости между факторами корпоративного роста (в частности, ростом продаж и численности персонала) и величиной коррупционных издержек бизнеса в исследуемых компаниях. В Иране наблюдается высокая вероятность манипулирования прибылью в финансовой отчетности экономических субъектов путем включения в нее «расходов на гостеприимство». Авторы предлагают измерять уровень взяточничества в фирмах через соотношения представительских и командировочных расходов к выручке от продаж. Этот показатель является наилучшим измерителем финансовой коррупции, так как основан на внутренних индикаторах компаний и отражает специфику экономических условий Ирана. Предполагается, что применение разработанного авторами критерия для раскрытия информации о фактах и динамике финансовой коррупции повысит прозрачность финансовой отчетности и будет способствовать устранению барьеров для роста и развития бизнеса.</p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><p>Corruption is a significant obstacle to growth and development in countries with weak policies and legal systems. This research explores the relationship between factors that affect company growth, the size of the workforce, and the expenses related to bribery. In Iran, where there is a high risk of profit manipulation and recent financial corruption, this study uses the ratio of accommodation, travel, and catering costs to a company’s sales as a criterion for assessing bribery. This approach is more accurate than traditional methods for understanding and controlling corruption because it considers the specific characteristics of the company and the economic conditions in the country, rather than international standards. To measure growth factors, we used indicators such as sales growth, workforce effectiveness growth, and growth opportunities. The study expects that by applying the criteria we developed, we can improve financial transparency, a crucial area that has been overlooked in previous research. Our analysis covers 100 Iranian companies over eight financial years, from 2015 to 2022. We used a multiple linear regression model with mixed data to analyze the data. The results of our statistical tests show that there is a negative relationship between sales growth and the size of the workforce affected by bribes.</p></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>финансовая коррупция</kwd><kwd>факторы корпоративного роста</kwd><kwd>численность персонала</kwd><kwd>коррупционные издержки</kwd><kwd>прибыль</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>financial corruption</kwd><kwd>corporate growth factors</kwd><kwd>workforce size</kwd><kwd>bribery expenses</kwd><kwd>profit</kwd></kwd-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="cit1"><label>1</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Hanousek J., Kochanova A. Bribery environments and firm performance: Evidence from CEE countries. European Journal of Political Economy. 2016; (43):14–28. 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