Company Growth Factors, Workforce Size and Bribery Expenses (Perspective of Performance and Development of Companies)

Corruption is a signifi   obstacle to growth and development in countries with weak policies and legal systems. This research explores the relationship between factors that affect company growth, the size of the workforce, and the expenses related to bribery. In Iran, where there is a high risk of profi manipulation and recent fi                                       corruption, this study uses the ratio of accommodation, travel, and catering costs to a company’s sales as a criterion for assessing bribery. This approach is more accurate than traditional methods for understanding and controlling corruption because it considers the specific characteristics of the company and the economic conditions in the country, rather than international standards. To measure growth factors, we used indicators such as sales growth, workforce effectiveness growth, and growth opportunities. The study expects that by applying the criteria we developed, we can improve financial transparency, a crucial area that has been overlooked in previous research. Our analysis covers 10 Iranian companies over eight financial years, from 2015 to 2022. We used a multiple linear regression model with mixed data to analyze the data. The results of our statistical tests show that there is a negative relationship between sales growth and the size of the workforce affected by bribes.

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